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THE MORAL HAZARD OF THE ESTATE TAX
CAROLYN C. JONES1
Basic elements of our federal tax system – the income and estate taxes – emerged
from the social debates of the Progressive era. Andrew Carnegie, in his famous
essay, “Wealth,” placed individual morality against a backdrop of social and
community need. He praised the heavy taxation of large estates left at death as the
means by which “the state marks its condemnation of the selfish millionaire’s
unworthy life.”2 Carnegie had a clear notion of the moral path for the wealthy. First,
“the man of Wealth” should “set an example of modest, unostentatious living”, and
then “provide moderately for the legitimate wants of those dependent on him.” All
surplus revenues should be considered “simply as trust funds” to be administered
according to his judgment in the manner “best calculated to produce the most
beneficial results for the community.”3 Carnegie saw “the man of Wealth” as “ the
mere agent and trustee for his poorer brethren, bringing to their service his superior
wisdom, experience, and ability to administer, doing for them better than they would
or could do for themselves.”4 The passage of federal income taxes and estate taxes
in the early twentieth century resulted in part from beliefs about morality.5 The
focus was upon the moral obligations of the wealthy to those less fortunate. For
Carnegie, at least, death was the point of reckoning on that score and death taxation a
moral instrument.

1
Carolyn Jones is a Professor of Law at the University of Connecticut School of Law. I
would like to thank Tom Baker and Carol Weisbrod, the participants in the Death of the
“Death Tax”? Conference at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law and the Faculty Workshop
at the University of Connecticut School of Law for comments on earlier versions of this essay.
Research support from the University of Connecticut School of Law is gratefully
acknowledged.
2

Andrew Carnegie, Wealth, NORTH AM. REV. 659 (June 1889).

3

Id. at 661-62.

4

Id. at 662. For an analysis of the degree to which the wealthy of the late nineteenth
century engaged in philanthropy, see Merle Curti, Judith Green & Roderick Nash, Anatomy of
Giving: Millionaires in the Late 19th Century, 15 AM. Q. 416, 419 (1963). The authors
concluded that self-made men were more philanthropic than those who had inherited wealth.
Id. at 429-30.
5

See EDWIN R.A. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 316-17 (9th ed. 1923).
(“. . .[T]he government cannot derive any revenue . . . without inevitably affecting
social relations . . . . The distinguishing mark of modern social science is that it
endeavors to explain not only what is, but also what should be. All practical action is
thus brought to the crucible of justice, and all systems of taxation are put to the test of
conformity with this principle, irrespective of the intentions of the legislature.”).
For a treatment of moral considerations surrounding tax policy see JOSEPH J. THORNDIKE III &
DENNIS J. VENTRY, JR., TAX JUSTICE FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: RECONSIDERING THE MORAL AND
ETHICAL BASIS OF TAXATION (forthcoming 2002).
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The current debate about wealth transfer taxation has its themes of morality as
well. Opponents have labeled the tax as “‘immoral”.6 Taxation is about morality. It
is both useful and necessary to consider moral arguments in the debate about the
estate tax. In an area largely consigned to economists and philosophers, it is
beneficial to broaden perspectives. One could expand the range of academic
disciplines considered―to history, psychology, and sociology, for example. One
should also take into account the narratives of those affected by the issue.7
This essay can only probe into this question. Beginning with Andrew Carnegie
and the similar sentiments of his contemporaries, one can imagine the landscape
against which Carnegie surveyed the estate tax as including the super rich and the
rest of society―both classes with their interests and roles to play. Those labeling the
estate tax as immoral today can be described as focusing more particularly upon the
decedent (her goals or habits) and the villain of the piece―the government―the tax
collector. This shift in frame is fundamental to today’s debate on the morality of

6

Republican lawmakers have condemned the estate tax as immoral. See, e.g., Richard W.
Stevenson, Veto of the Estate-Tax Repeal Survives Vote in the House, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8,
2000, at A22, col. 1 (Rep. Jennifer Dunn called the estate tax an “immoral, unfair, and
economically unsound tax.”); Jackie Koszczuk, Senate OKs inheritance tax repeal, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE, July 15, 2000, at A-1 (Sen. Phil Gramm stated “Republicans believe that is
unfair, that is un-American and that is immoral.”); Jake Thompson, Benefits of Repealing the
Estate Tax Debated, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, July 13, 2000, at 1 (“Whether it’s a farm, ranch
or store, [Sen. Chuck] Hagel said, taxing it after death is immoral.”). Such sentiments have
been expressed in letters to editors.
Academics have also argued that the estate tax is immoral. See Edward McCaffery &
Richard Wagner, A Bipartisan Declaration of Independence from Death Taxation, TAX
NOTES, August 7, 2000, at 801; Edward McCaffery, In Favor of Repeal, in Edward J.
McCaffery, Charles Davenport & James Halpern, Should We End Life Support for Death
Taxes?, TAX NOTES, Sept. 11, 2000, at 1373; Edward J. McCaffery, Grave Robbers: The
Moral Case Against the Death Tax, TAX NOTES, Dec. 13, 1999, at 1429. McCaffery’s articles
argue for a progressive consumption tax. Edward J. McCaffery, Tax Policy Under a Hybrid
Income-Consumption Tax, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1145 (1992); Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy
Case for Wealth Transfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283 (1994); see also Edward J. McCaffery,
Tax’s Empire, 85 GEO. L.J. 71 (1996). For an article agreeing that taxation is “fundamentally
a moral issue”, but reaching a different result as to the morality of the estate tax, see Dennis J.
Ventry, Jr., Straight Talk About the “Death” Tax: Politics, Economics and Morality, TAX
NOTES, Nov. 27, 2000, at 1159. Taxation is of course, not the only area of law with concerns
about the degree and extent of moral discourse. For example, see Carl E. Schneider,
Marriage, Morals and the Law: No-Fault Divorce and Moral Discourse, 1994 UTAH L. REV.
503; Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83
MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985).
7
Carolyn C. Jones, Mapping Tax Narratives, 73 TUL. L. REV. 653 (1998). One factor to
consider in the use of narratives is the attention to direct cause and effect. When one considers
the stories of those subject to taxation, narratives can be useful. It is more difficult to narrate
the story of those whose lives may be improved because of the expenditure of wealth transfer
tax revenues. This can have an unfortunate class-based effect. One illustration of the problem
can be found in the use of tax narratives in the woman suffrage campaign. Carolyn C. Jones,
Dollars and Selves: Women’s Tax Criticism and Resistance in the 1870s, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV.
265, 300-06 (1994).
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estate taxation.8 My project is to consider such moral arguments more seriously than
many estate tax opponents have. We can see in the opposition to the estate tax
connections with deep seated cultural and social values. However, the stories are not
simple, and different arguments advanced about the immorality of the tax are not
particularly consonant.
For me, a concept important to another area of law - insurance - has been useful
in structuring my understanding of the estate tax immorality arguments. This
concept is “moral hazard.” One can draw an analogy between estate taxation and life
insurance. The contention that estate taxation is immoral is based in part on the
repugnant mixture of the sacred and the profane. The moment of death and its
aftermath raise questions of the sacred. Opponents see the government as a profane
opportunist making death a money-making (taxable) event. Similarly, life insurance
faced a very difficult start in the United States in the early nineteenth century. Why?
It was viewed as a foul mixture of the sacred and profane with gambling thrown in
for good measure. Insurance scholars, also writing about intersections of death,
money and morality, can provide a deeper appreciation of the cultural valences
involved.
Sociologist Viviana Zelizer in her book Morals and Markets described the
problem.
The growth of individualism resulted in a new respect for the infinite
worth of human personality, displacing the earlier utilitarianism with an
absolute valuation of human beings. In an increasingly industrialized
market economy dominated by the “cash nexus,” human life and human
feelings were culturally segregated into their separate incommensurable
realm. Life insurance threatened the sanctity of life by pricing it.
Insurance was uncomfortably reminiscent of the primitive institution of
the wergild, or “blood-money” when the murder of a man was restituted
with the payment of money. Thus, the financial evaluation of a man’s life
introduced by the industry was initially rejected by many as a profanation
which transformed the sacred event of death into a vulgar commodity.9
Related to the moral problem of incommensurability of money and life, was
another issue―moral hazard. During the nineteenth century, fire insurance
companies were concerned about coverage not only of physical hazards but also of
“moral hazards.” Those of weak or bad character were susceptible to temptation.
8

I know that this phrase probably gives me away. If I were an estate tax opponent, I would
be discussing the immorality of the death tax. The use of “death tax” is often credited to
Republican pollster Frank Luntz (or, some would say, Frank Luntz has taken credit for this
move). Luntz has said that he persuaded Trent Lott and other Republican lawmakers to use
“death tax” when advocating the repeal of federal wealth transfer taxes. Peter Stone, Man with
a Message, 29 NAT’L J. 750 (1997). Luntz’s rhetorical move is consistent with the importance
he places on language: As he claimed in GOPAC guide: “Words are everything. They can
declare war or define a peace. They can soothe or inflame . . . We have found the words and
phrases that will move the American people.” Id. In one poll by Luntz Research Companies in
1999, 69% of those polled viewed death and inheritance taxes as unfair. Charles D. Fox IV,
Repeal of Estate and Gift Tax: Rising Tide or High-Water Mark?, 139 TR. & EST. 56 (2000).
9

VIVIANA A. ROTMAN ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS: THE DEVELOPMENT
INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 150-51 (1983).
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Even people of good character could be tempted by the insurance relationship itself.
Tom Baker, in his article On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, has skillfully traced
the evolution of this nineteenth century character-based concept of moral hazard into
its late twentieth century incarnation. Today, moral hazard is used to argue that there
are “perverse consequences of well-intentioned efforts to share the burdens of life”,
and these harmful externalities suggest that redistribution should be limited.10
The notion of moral hazard provides a useful grid to explore the morality of the
death tax. Contemporary opposition to the tax may be viewed through this lens of
moral hazard. Baker’s very rich analysis enables us to see that both the nineteenth
century character-based approach and the more recent economic externalities
approach are at work in moral thinking about the estate tax.
This essay begins with character-based arguments by first illustrating this
approach within the field of insurance. This character theme is then translated into
the realm of taxation. Taking the current focus on decedents and their beneficiaries
as a given for this part of the essay, one asks “Is the government tempted to do
wrong, to act immorally, because of the existence of the estate tax?”
A story from World War I suggests the government’s own concerns on this front
with regard to taxing the estates of servicemen killed in wartime. That sense of the
government as bad actor extends to more mundane deaths as estate taxation is seen
to be interfering with the achievement of a decedent’s plans. Human beings have
very important connections to their property. Does this form of taxation interfere
with symbolic immortality? The estate tax with its tax base of fair market value
generally takes an undifferentiated view of property. Scholars have perceived
complicated relationships with different sorts of property, relationships in some cases
that are constitutive of personality and expressive of life’s goals. When the
government, by taxation, disrupts these relationships and social meanings, is the
government’s behavior immoral?
A second moral hazard analysis moves from moral questions which posit the
government as a greedy insured to the government in the role of insurance company
“redistributing wealth.” By taxing those who have saved to build an estate, the
government is said to reduce the incentive to save and invest–creating a perverse
incentive to spend. This is Baker’s contemporary version of moral hazard–“the
perverse consequences of well-intentioned efforts to share the burdens of life.” The
writings of those who have considered the morality of spending during the twentieth
century can considerably enrich this moral hazard argument. Indeed, some writers
have argued against oversaving and have encouraged spending, particularly spending
for culture and refinement.11

10
Tom Baker, On the Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEX. L. REV. 237 (1996). For
purposes of this essay, I am defining an externality as “aris[ing] when the decisions of some
economic agents―whether in production, in consumption, or in exchange―affect other
economic agents in ways that do not set up legally recognized rights of compensation or
redress.” Externalities can be harmful or beneficial. JACK HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS 484 (3d ed. 1976).
11
Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Americans have been urged to
express their patriotism by shopping. See, e.g., Michiko Kakutani, The Trivial Assumes
Symbolism of Tragedy, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2001, at 1B. One conceptual problem, of course,
is in the definition of spending, as opposed to saving and in the iteration of categories of
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Finally, the question of framing returns. If the moral actor is no longer the
government, but the wealthy person, the Progessive Era arguments for an estate tax
return. Carnegie would argue that the wealthy man with no philanthropic impulse
should be condemned as a person of bad character. The positive externalities of
estate taxation are rarely described in the compendium of tales of the IRS. Just as
duties to oneself, to one’s family and to society in general are all implicated in a
consideration of mortality and morality in the insurance field, so these same issues
arise with respect to estate taxation.
I. LIFE, DEATH AND MORAL HAZARD
The nineteenth century insurance trade used the term “moral hazard” to describe
both people (“negligent and fraudulent insureds”) and situations (those inviting what
an Aetna Guide to Fire Insurance called “carelessness and roguery.”).12 While these
concerns were often discussed in the context of property insurance, similar concerns
arose with respect to life insurance.13
A. The Example of Child Life Insurance
Perhaps one of the most vivid illustrations of this concern with moral hazard can
be found in the example of child life insurance. In the latter part of the nineteenth
century, insurance companies found that they could successfully market child life
insurance costing a few pennies per week.14 The purchasers were working-class or
poor families who were interested in an alternative to pauper burial.15 As the
companies sold more policies, child protection groups opposed child insurance as
“an offensive symbol of the prevalent materialistic orientation toward childhood”
and the companies that sold such policies as having “child-blood” on their hands.16
A newspaper article in 1878 portrayed children’s insurance as a “dangerous incentive
to murder . . . . It is not only the inducement which inhuman parents . . . find in
insurance on their children to ill treat them or put them out of the way, but it is the
tendency to cause them to neglect their children in their sickness and . . . the
demoralizing effect produced by parents speculating on the lives of their children.”17
Poor and working class parents who stood to benefit from the policies were seen as
moral hazards―people of low character, incipient murderers who would kill (or at
spending. Outlays of money (for education, for example) may have current consumption
benefits while building human capital.
12

Tom Baker, Insuring Morality, 29 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 559, 562 (2000).

13

VIVIANA A. ROTMAN ZELIZER, MORALS AND MARKETS: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE
INSURANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 67-89 (1983). “For many, life insurance not only offended
religious sensitivities, but weakened the very fiber of society by institutionalizing gambling
and encouraging murder for money.” Id. at 79.
14

VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING
CHILDREN 114, 118 (1994).

THE

PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE

OF

15

Id. at 114-15.

16

Id. at 118.

17

Id. Over time as child mortality rates dropped child insurance continued to be sold, not
so much as burial insurance, but as a “nest egg” or an endowment for a child at age sixteen or
twenty-one. Id. at 132-37.
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least fail to get medical help for an ailing child). Efforts to outlaw child insurance
were premised both on the elimination of temptation and on keeping the death of a
child from resulting in pecuniary compensation. Parents were seen as moral hazards
capable of causing their children’s deaths.
About two decades after these campaigns to outlaw child insurance, a
comparable story of tax moral hazard emerged.18
B. The Example of World War I - Government as Moral Hazard
On April 7, 1917, the United States entered World War I.19 In the following
month, Congress passed the Selective Service Act authorizing the registration and
draft of all men between twenty-one and thirty years of age.20 A few months later,
Congress enacted a War Estate Tax, to be imposed in addition to a regular estate
tax.21 The new War Estate Tax contained a provision exempting those “dying while
serving in the military or naval forces of the United States during the continuance of
the war in which the United States is now engaged, or if death results from injuries
received or disease contracted in such service, within one year after the termination
of such war.”22 The Senate Finance Committee was concerned about the estate tax
as an emergency measure.23 “Particularly, is it to be remembered that perhaps a
majority of those dying during the war and leaving estates to be taxed will be
soldiers and sailors dying in defense of our country.”24
As it turned out, the influenza of 1918 coincided with the last months of World
War I. While troops poured into crowded barracks and ships and as civilians moved
about during the war, pandemic flu spread. Over 43,000 soldiers and sailors died of
the flu and pneumonia, constituting about eighty percent of American battle deaths.25

18
ZELIZER, supra note 14, at 120-25. In 1895, the Massachusetts Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Children introduced a bill to outlaw insurance on the lives of children
under ten years of age, although it was defeated.
19

Joint Resolution Declaring that a state of war exists between the Imperial German
Government and the Government and People of the United States and making provision to
prosecute the same. 40 Stat. 1 (Apr. 6, 1917).
20

Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, 40 Stat. 76.

21

Revenue Act of October 3, 1917 [H.R. 4280], Pub. L. No. 65-50, § 901.

22
Id. at 87-88. See also Edwin R. A. Seligman, The War Revenue Act, 33 POLITICAL
SCIENCE Q. 1, 7 (1918).
23

“Only if continued at the same rate for many years - the period of a generation - does it
become equal for all persons in like situation.” Revenues to Defray War Expenses, Report to
Accompany H.R. 4280, REP. No. 65-103, at 14 (1917).
24
Id. In the Revenue Act of 1918, all estate tax obligations were relieved for those soldiers
and sailors dying during the war as a result of war injuries or disease. The 1917 Act had
merely exempted them from the supplemental war estate tax. Revenue Act of 1918, ch. 18, 40
Stat. 1057 (1919).
25

ALFRED W. CROSBY, AMERICA’S FORGOTTEN PANDEMIC: THE INFLUENZA
(1989).
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In all, about 550,000 Americans succumbed to this Spanish influenza and its
complications.26
Senator Robert LaFollette of Wisconsin painted a somewhat different view of the
identity of those likely to pay wealth taxes. He pointed out that “two percent of the
people of this country own sixty-five percent of its wealth.”27 Like many
progressives of his time, LaFollette saw big business pushing the United States into
war in order to accumulate vast profits.28 One of his Senatorial colleagues called war
profiteers the “blood sucking tarantula upon the American people.”29 LaFollette
wondered, “Is it too much to ask that the taxes of this war should be paid for so far as
possible out of the great wealth of these two million people, particularly as the
people of the poorer class will be more largely drawn upon for soldiers to suffer and
die in unestimated numbers in order that the war may be prosecuted?”30
To many during World War I, the government was an accomplice to profiteering
corporations, using war to boost corporate revenues. American soldiers and sailors
were seen as dying for money. The government, in drafting men, required a sacrifice
of time and, in some cases, of life itself. The sense that it would be too much to tax
the estates of military personnel was not really disputed. Like the parents of insured
working children, the government could be seen as a moral hazard, profiting from
death it had compelled. The imposition of the newly enacted estate tax on the estate
of those dying in their country’s service was seen as immoral.
C. Government Interference With Symbolic Immortality
To the contemporary opponents of the estate tax, the problem of government
immorality is not based upon profiteering upon wartime death, but rather upon more
general issues of the identity of the deceased and his or her relation to property. As
one opponent put it:
The estate tax is immoral and dishonors the hard work of people who have
passed on. Something is sacred about the fruits of your parents’ labor, and
you have a deep sense to protect it. This is their legacy and it is
representative of what their life is all about. This tax violates the sanctity
of those efforts and the government should not take part of it.31

26
Id. at 207. Katherine Anne Porter’s novella Pale Horse, Pale Rider described the flu’s
effect on the narrator as she lost her lover and became afflicted herself. KATHERINE ANNE
PORTER, PALE HORSE, PALE RIDER: THREE SHORT NOVELS (1939).
27

H.R. REP. NO. 65-103, pt.2, at 11 (1917).

28

These views were advanced by peace activists and socialists. See Carolyn C. Jones,
Taxes and Peace: A Case Study of Taxing Women, 6 S. CAL. REV. OF LAW AND WOMEN’S
STUDIES 361, 387-90 (1997). Some of these concerns led to the adoption of World War I’s
excess profits tax. W. Elliot Brownlee, Economists and the Formation of the Modern Tax
System in the United States: the World War I Crisis, in THE STATE AND ECONOMIC
KNOWLEDGE 401 (Mary O. Furner & Barry Supple eds., 1990).
29

RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 116 (1954).

30

Id. at 11-12.

31

John Meagher of the House Ways and Means Committee quoted in Kerri Houston, A
Morally, Economically Bankrupt Tax, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, June 11, 1999, at A22.
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The connection between human beings and the material world was a recurring
theme for twentieth century intellectuals. Sociologist Georg Simmel described
ownership “as an acting with and upon” things.”32 In 1900, he wrote:
To understand the concept of property it is decisive to recognize that the
rigid demarcation between it and the self, between internal and external
life, is quite superficial and that it should be made more fluid for the
purpose of a deeper interpretation. On the one hand, the whole
significance of property lies in the fact that it releases certain emotions
and impulses of the soul, while on the other hand the sphere of the Ego
extends both over and into these ‘external’ objects just as the process in
the mind of the violinist or the painter is continually transferred to the
movement of the violin’s bow or the brush. Just as the possession of any
external object would be meaningless if it did not have a psychic value,
so, at the same time, the Ego would collapse and lose its dimensions if it
were not surrounded by external objects which become the expression of
its tendencies, its strength and its individual manner because they obey or,
in other words, belong to it.33
The connections between people and things have been seen as extending across
time and through generations. French historian Philippe Ariès in his essay “Western
Attitudes Toward Death” traces the evolution of such thought from the Middle Ages
to the present. His survey found that, for modern Western families, “even when they
believed in the afterlife . . . death became the unaccepted separation, the death of the
other, “thy death,” the death of the loved one.” In our day, he said, “death has
become unnameable. Everything henceforth goes on as if neither I nor those who
are dear to me are any longer mortal.”34
If death is unacceptable and unnameable, immortality in its various forms is a
solution. Things have a role in that story.
Behavioral scientist Mihaly
Csikzentmihalyi and sociologist Eugene Rochberg-Halton described that
interrelationship:
When an object is imbued with qualities of the self, it expresses the being
of that person, whether in written words or a chair that was crafted or a
photograph. It becomes an objectified form of consciousness no less than
words spoken into someone’s ear, all forming part of the social self.
Through these objects a part of the self comes to be embodied in the
consciousness of others and will continue to exist long after the
consciousness that molded them has ceased to exist. Perhaps the clearest
example is when a number of people gather to mourn for someone at a
wake or funeral. These people―family, kin, and friends of the departed
person―are the living representation of the deceased. Although the
personal self has ceased to exist, the social self has a continued existence

32

GEORG SIMMEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY 321 (David Frisby ed., 2d ed. 1990) (1907).

33

Id. at 322-34.

34

PHILIPPE ARIÈS, WESTERN ATTITUDES TOWARD DEATH: FROM THE MIDDLE AGES TO THE
PRESENT 106-07 (Patricia M. Ranom trans., 1974).
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in those who will remember and through those artifacts that in whatever
way give testimony to that person.35
Robert Jay Lifton and Eric Olson have seen five modes of symbolic immortality, two
of which are especially relevant to the estate tax debate. First is biological
immortality―living on through children, although this can also be characterized as
“biosocial immortality”―“the continuity of one’s family and other social
groupings.”36 They also identify a creative mode of symbolic immortality―one
expressed as human works.37
For human beings the translation of spirit into thing is critical to the maintenance
of human culture. Hannah Arendt wrote of this in The Human Condition:
The whole factual world of human affairs depends for its reality and its
continued existence, first, upon the presence of others who have seen and
heard and will remember, and second, on the transformation of the
intangible into the tangibility of things. Without remembrance and
without the reification which remembrance needs for its own fulfilment
and which makes it, indeed, as the Greeks held, the mother of all arts, the
living activities of action, speech and thought would lose their reality at
the end of each process and disappear as though they had never been. . . .
The reality and reliability of the human world rest primarily on the fact
that we are surrounded by things more permanent than the activity by
which they were produced, and potentially even more permanent than the
lives of their authors. Human life, in so far as it is world-building, is
engaged in a constant process of reification, and the degree of worldliness
of produced things, which all together form the human artifice, depends
upon their greater or lesser permanence in the world itself.38
One can see in these arguments deep-seated notions about identity, death and
symbolic immortality. By taxing property owned or controlled at death and by
compelling its liquidation in order to pay taxes, the government is profiting from the
symbolic death it inflicts. Inherited property has been characterized as “sacred” and
the efforts that produced the things are said to have a “sanctity” in the current
debates about the morality of estate taxation.39 These critics, however, often refer to
particular types of property, such as a family business or a farm. This leads to the
question of whether estate taxation always interferes with symbolic immortality (the
continuation of one’s family and one’s works).

35

MIHALY CSIKSZENTMIHALYI & EUGENE ROCHBERG-HALTON, THE MEANING
DOMESTIC SYMBOLS AND THE SELF 190-91 (1981).

OF

THINGS:

36

ROBERT JAY LIFTON & ERIC OLSON, LIVING AND DYING 76-77 (1974). Robert Jay Lifton
wrote of this type of immortality in his article on death, dying and Hiroshima. Robert Jay
Lifton, On Death and Death Symbolism: The Hiroshima Disaster, 27 PSYCHIATRY 191, 203
(1964) [hereinafter Lifton].
37

LIFTON & OLSON, supra note 36, at 77-78. See Lifton, supra note 36, at 203-04.

38

HANNAH ARENDT, THE HUMAN CONDITION 95-96 (1958).

39

See, e.g. Meagher, supra note 31, at A22.
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Some legal scholars have suggested that some types of property may be more
important to personhood than others. For example, Margaret Radin has suggested “a
continuum that ranges from a thing indispensable to someone’s being to a thing
wholly interchangeable with money.”40 In exploring the loss of objects, Radin stated
“In general, the moral inquiry for whether fungible property could be taken would be
the same as the moral inquiry for whether it is fair to impose a tax on this particular
person.”41 In the takings realm, she argued that “a few objects” may be so personal
“that no compensation could be just.”42
Ray Madoff has applied Radin’s insights into property and personality to the area
of estate tax.43 Generally, the estate tax is imposed on the fair market value of assets
in the gross estate, usually on the date of the decedent’s death.44 Fair market value is
“the price at which the property would trade hands between a willing buyer and
willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having
reasonable knowledge of relevant facts.”45
Madoff focused on the harm to personhood that may result by taxing the right of
publicity. The inclusion of the value of such a right in the wealth transfer tax base
may compel beneficiaries to exploit a decedent’s name and image in undesired ways
in order to pay the tax liability.46 The estate tax could necessitate the creation of
ghostwritten books,47 revivification of discarded manuscripts, the creation of an
“Ernest Hemingway” line of furniture.48
Madoff argued that the extent to which “property interests . . . are closely aligned
with an individual’s identity” varies. She used Radin’s continuum, ranging from
“constitutive property” (“a thing indispensable to someone’s being”) to fungible
property (“a thing wholly interchangeable with money”).49 She argued for varying
estate tax treatment based upon this understanding, while noting that our current
estate tax system, in its relief provisions for family farms and businesses, recognizes
this principle to some extent.50
Small businesses and farms are leading candidates for classification as
constitutive property. A 1904 Atlantic Monthly essay begins with the argument that
“the small business . . . was a school of character second in importance only to the
40

Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957, 987 (1982).

41

Id. at 1005.

42

Id.

43

Ray D. Madoff, Taxing Personhood: Estate Taxes and the Compelled Commodification
of Identity, 17 VA. TAX REV. 759 (1998).
44

I.R.C. §§ 2031, 2032.

45

Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-1(b).

46

Madoff, supra note 43, at 762.

47

Estate of Andrews v. United States, 850 F. Supp 1279 (E.D. Va. 1994).

48

See Joe Sharkey, Word for Word/Hemingway Memorabilia, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 1999,
at § 4, at 7.
49

Id. at 798.

50

Id. at 804 et. seq. See, eg., I.R.C. §§ 2032A, 2057.
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Church.”51 The clergyman who wrote the article contended that dependence on
customer good will “kept [the small businessman] under an impulse to be courteous
and honest and considerate and truthful, until these traits become largely
characteristic.”52 In other words, the author viewed the business holding as
constitutive of character. Although not labeled as spiritual immortality, the author
mentions long range concerns. The author described “[t]he pride of the merchant, or
the manufacturer, in the business to which he was giving his life, and which bore his
name, and which he hoped to make permanent in the community and to transmit to
his children.”53
The same sort of praise for small business has been repeated during the twentieth
century. A 1945 report to the Senate Small Business Committee highlighted the
character-building aspects of small business: “[small business] stimulates expression
of the fundamental values of thrift, industry, intelligence, schooling, home ties and
family pride – in short those fireside virtues which have counted for so much in
developing our strength and character as a nation.”54 In another government report, a
businessman described his independence, an independence in part inherited. “I own
this whole outfit, as a matter of fact, my father did before me. It’s all paid for. In
addition, I have a little stock and a little farm my grandfather bought up. So when
the plants slacken up or close down I can coast for a while.”55
In small business, then, one could express one’s autonomy and freedom,
according to this line. The habits of freedom and business sense could be
transformed into a legacy to be lived out through the lives of one’s children or
grandchildren and in passing one’s creative product, a business, into the future.
The idea of constitutive property can extend beyond publicity rights, small
businesses and farms. A home can be seen as crucial to one’s identity. Madoff has
suggested that death can diminish the constitutive nature of a home. “[O]nce that
person has died, the home loses that aspect (although not all aspects) of personal

51

Henry A. Stimson, The Small Business as a School for Manhood, 93 ATLANTIC
MONTHLY 337, 337 (1904) [hereinafter Stimson]. In many ways, a family farm can be seen as
a similar sort of constitutive property. As with small business, there are elements of a strong
intergenerational commitment to maintenance of farm life. For a documentary demonstrating
the constitutive nature of farm property, see TROUBLESOME CREEK: A MIDWESTERN (West
City Films, Inc., 1997).
52

Stimson, supra note 51, at 337.

53

Id. at 338-39. What may distinguish this 1904 view from more contemporary accounts
is the very heavy contrast drawn between small business and the “great corporations”. Those
employed by great corporations were described as “clerks” and “servants” “removed from the
stimulus, intellectual and moral, which the necessities of meeting the conditions of
independent business require.” This hostility to big business in contrast to its small
counterpart is a hallmark of Progressive Era thinking and could, arguably, justify estate
taxation of the “swollen fortunes” at the top of the “great corporations.” Id. at 339-40.
54

SENATE SMALL BUSINESS COMMITTEE-ITS RECORD AND OUTLOOK: PROGRESS REPORT OF
THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN SMALL BUSINESS, S. REP. NO. 7947, at 2 (1945).
55

ROWLAND BERTHOFF, INDEPENDENCE AND ENTERPRISE: SMALL BUSINESS IN THE
AMERICAN DREAM IN SMALL BUSINESS IN AMERICAN LIFE 39 (Stuart W. Bruchey ed., 1980).
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identity since that person can no longer live there.”56 Geographic dispersion of
family members may make a family’s second home intergenerational constitutive
property. Nelson Aldrich, Jr. in his recent New York Times essay wrote of such a
situation. “Our family’s house is on the New England coast; its view of the ocean is
a blessing. All the grace notes of my being originated there. So did my expectations
of life, from learning as a boy to make the best of a good sailboat on the
uncontrollable sea.”57
Cash and publicly traded stocks seem to be the prototypes of fungible property.
Money is instrumental, interchangeable, “colorless.”58 Simmel argued that money’s
“quality consists exclusively in its quantity.”59 He saw that money was both “the
most complete extension [of the self] that can be derived from an object” and a
limited extension of ego because its “flexibility is only that of an extremely liquid
body which takes on any form.60 Yet, money and cash equivalents are not entirely
fungible.61 Anthropologist Mary Douglas has written that “many of us try to
primitivize our money . . . by placing restrictions at source, by earmarking monetary
instruments of certain kinds for certain purposes, by only allowing ourselves or our
wives certain limited freedoms in the disposal of money.”62 Economist Richard
Thaler has described what he calls “mental accounting”―“the set of cognitive
operations used by individuals and households to organize, evaluate, and keep track
of financial activities.”63 Economists have observed that households create wealth
accounts with different degrees of availability for spending.64 People also earmark
money by the source of funds.65 Gifts as well as death money may be earmarked.
Such monies are kept separate. Life insurance proceeds may be set apart. Wrongful
death awards may be given to charity. An inheritance may be seen as a nest egg to

56

Madoff, supra note 43, at 799-800.

57

Nelson W. Aldrich, Jr., Estate of the Nation, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 3, 2000,
at 17. Aldrich supported the estate tax despite concerns about its effect on the family property.
For commentary on summer homes, see MARJORIE GARBER, SEX AND REAL ESTATE: WHY WE
LOVE HOUSES 181-204 (2000).
58

GEORG SIMMEL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 44 (Kurt H. Wolf ed., 1950) (1908),
cited in VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE SOCIAL MEANING OF MONEY 1 (1994).
59
GEORG SIMMEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF MONEY 259 (David Frisby ed., 2d enlarged edition
1990) (1907).
60

Id. at 326.

61
Viviana Zelizer has made this argument in The Social Meaning of Money. ZELIZER,
supra note 58, at 2, 5.
62

MARY DOUGLAS, PRIMITIVE RATIONING IN THEMES IN ECONOMIC ANTHROPOLOGY 139
(Raymond Firth ed., 1967), cited in ZELIZER, supra note 58, at 23.
63
Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, in CHOICES, VALUES AND FRAMES 241
(Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000). I am indebted to Joel Dobris for a reference
to these materials.
64

Id. at 257-58.

65

Id. at 259.
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be preserved, or else spent on nonroutine purchases.66 This earmarking process tends
to make money less fungible, even constitutive.
Some sense of the nonfungibility of money and its equivalent can be gleaned
from a recent op-ed in the New York Times. Stanley Herz described his immigrant
in-laws who lived frugally, saving money by purchasing AT&T stock.
His widow, then approaching eighty, was satisfied to have the cushion to
provide for contingencies (read: nursing home). And near the end of her
life, when it was clear that she wouldn’t outlive her assets, she was proud
she would be leaving money to her daughter and grandchildren.
Then the stock market took off, and now my wife is about to give Uncle
Sam a big chunk of Peter and Elsa’s lifetime investments―more than a
third of everything over $675,000. (The tax is graduated, with a top rate of
55 percent.) Most children and grandchildren who must forfeit part of an
inheritance are from similarly middle-class families were assets arose
from hard work and steady savings―family values that shouldn’t be
penalized.67
The inheritance from Peter and Elsa was seen as a fund expressive of the values in
their lives. The money, the AT&T stock had social meaning that could be
transmitted to the next generation. The savings were, in a sense, a creative product.
To opponents of the estate tax, the government is a greedy profiteer on death. In
this case, death is not actual physical death, but rather a perceived destruction of
property seen as constitutive of the deceased’s personality, of property that gives to
one’s successors the fruits of creation whether the product is a name, a farm, a
business, a summer home or an earmarked fund.
II. AN ECONOMIC APPROACH TO MORAL HAZARD
A more modern approach to moral hazard is less character-based and, instead
uses economic analysis. In the 1960s economist Kenneth Arrow wrote about health
insurance addressing “moral hazard”―“the effect of insurance on incentives.”68
Patients who do not have to pay the full cost for their medical care will be more
likely to visit doctors and use medical services. The focus shifts from character to
incentives. Economists have argued that this modern “moral hazard” has “little to do
with morality” and focuses instead on rational people acting in their individual best
interests.69 Moral hazard can be described as the undesirable consequences of wellintentioned efforts to share burdens.70
This same type of moral hazard argument is part of the current debate. As
Edward McCaffery has written recently, “The quickest and most important take on
the immorality of the estate tax is that it falls on the wrong people; that is the wrong
66

ZELIZER, supra note 58, at 29.

67

Stanley Herz, Rich? No, Frugal, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2000, at A29.

68

Kenneth Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON.
REV. 941, 961 (1963), cited in Baker, supra note 12, at 567.
69

Baker, supra note 12, at 560-61.

70

Baker, supra note 10, at 239.
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rich people. It falls on savers, not spenders.”71 McCaffery, like economists using
contemporary notions of moral hazard, is concerned about incentive effects. He does
distinguish himself from those claiming a “technical”, “scientific” or “amoral”
stance, with his explicit recognition of the importance of morality to this question.72
McCaffery does not present evidence demonstrating that the estate tax leads the
rich to work and save less.73 He argues that incentives in that direction are immoral.
He writes:
[A reasonable liberal society] should be wary of its rich spending
inordinate sums of money on themselves, on their own pleasures, whether
this is buying up yachts to compete in the America’s Cup, piling up
trophy houses, or running for elected office on their own considerable
dimes. The estate tax is backwards―perverse―on these fronts; it spares
the spenders, however decadent, and falls heavily on the savers, however
thrifty and productive.74
McCaffery’s argument needs to be placed into a larger context in order to really
consider the morality or moral hazard of the estate tax. Mary Douglas and Baron
Isherwood in The World of Goods have written:
But it is interesting to observe the very different values that different
societies set on the ratio of consumption to income. Spending only a
small proportion of income may in one place and time be called thrifty,
wise and provident; in another it may be held to be miserly, mean and
wrong. Conversely, a high ratio of consumption may be approved as
generous, magnificent, and good in one culture, while in another the
selfsame behavior may be called spendthrift, feckless and bad. Evidently,
the social context that generates the appropriate judgment must be worth
examining.75
The debate over the morality of spending has continued through American
history.76 Those condemning spending have earned prominent places in American
71
Edward McCaffery, In Favor of the Repeal in Should We End Life Support for Death
Taxes?, TAX NOTES, Sept. 11, 2000, at 1378.
72

Id. at 1379.

73

Edward J. McCaffery, Being the Best We Can Be, 51 TAX L. REV. 615, 624 (1996) (“I do
not mean that there necessarily will be more consumption under an estate tax, or more work
and savings without it. Rather it is a moral argument; it is one that looks where the tax falls,
as a matter of principle or fairness.”). See also Anne Alstott, The Uneasy Liberal Case
Against Income and Wealth Transfer Taxation: A Response to Professor McCaffery, 51 TAX
L. REV. 363, 386-88 (1996).
74

McCaffery, supra note 71, at 1380. I am putting aside for the moment one problematic
aspect of McCaffery’s argument. A lot of what Thorstein Veblen would call “conspicuous
consumption”―a trophy or summer house for example can, in fact, result in estate taxation.
75
MARY DOUGLAS & BARON ISHERWOOD, THE WORLD
ANTHROPOLOGY OF CONSUMPTION 12 (1996).

OF

GOODS: TOWARDS

AN

76

DANIEL HOROWITZ, THE MORALITY OF SPENDING: ATTITUDES TOWARD THE CONSUMER
SOCIETY IN AMERICA, 1875-1940 (1985). Anne Alstott makes the point that savings is not
always good and spending bad:
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thought. Henry David Thoreau set an example of what he called “Spartan
simplicity” at Walden Pond.77 Thorstein Veblen’s classic, The Theory of the Leisure
Class, satirized conspicuous consumption by the wealthy.78 The critique of
consumption extended to the less fortunate as a consumer society took hold in the
1920s. In Middletown, a 1929 study of Muncie, Indiana, Robert and Helen Lynd
saw consumerism displacing a simple, centered small town life at the turn of the
twentieth century. In their chapter, “Why Do They Work So Hard,” they wrote:
The rise of large-scale advertising, popular magazines, movies, radio, and
other channels of increased cultural diffusion from without are rapidly
changing habits of thought as to what things are essential to living and
multiplying optional occasions for spending money. Installment buying,
which turns wishes into horses overnight, and the heavy increase in the
number of children receiving higher education, with its occasions for
breaking with home traditions, are facilitating this rise to new standards of
living.79
Robert Frank’s Luxury Fever, a discussion of luxury consumption over the past
twenty years, follows the tradition of criticizing consumption of goods that go
beyond the functional and ordinary. Frank argues that the spending of the super rich
“has been a virus, one that’s spawned a luxury fever that, to one degree or another,
has all of us in its grip.”80
Against this tradition of moralism, one needs to place a different tradition-- one
more accepting of consumption. This tradition saw spending as a way to the higher
values in life, a route to culture and refinement. While George Washington
Vanderbilt’s Biltmore estate with its 125,000 acres and 250 rooms could be seen as
the epitome of conspicuous consumption, George Gunton praised Biltmore as
“leading the way to a new direction of devoting American wealth to the uplifting of
[the] American standard of taste and cultivation.”81
The core of this “pro-consumption” tradition, however, was focused on middle
and working class expenditures rather than lavish spending by the wealthy. In 1907,
The broader point is - once again - that there is nothing intrinsically good about
savings or bad about consumption, without specifying in more detail how savings
serve liberal norms like liberty, equality of opportunity or security for the least
advantaged. Although savings may promote long-term investment and economic
growth, the question of the “right” rate of savings is notoriously difficult when taken
seriously.
Alstott, supra note 73, at 389.
77
HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 136 (Penguin Books 1983)
(1854).
78

THORSTEIN VEBLEN, THE THEORY OF THE LEISURE CLASS (Penguin Books 1994) (1899).

79

ROBERT S. LYND & HELEN MERRELL LYND, MIDDLETOWN: A STUDY
AMERICAN CULTURE 81-82 (1956).

IN

MODERN

80

ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER: MONEY AND HAPPINESS IN AN ERA OF EXCESS (1999).
For a review of Frank’s book, see, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, The Tyranny of Money, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2126 (2000).
81

George Gunton, The Opening of Biltmore, GUNTON’S MAGAZINE, Jan. 1896, at 34-35, in
HOROWITZ, supra note 76, at 45 n.41.
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economist Simon Patten wrote, “The new morality does not consist in saving, but in
expanding consumption . . . We lack . . . courage to live joyous lives, not remorse,
sacrifice and renunciation.”82 In a series of articles in the years before World War I,
Martha and Robert Bruère presented case studies of middle class families’ budgets.
They criticized excessive thrift and an insufficient level of comfort.83 In critiquing
the Wells family living near Boston, the Bruères admonished Mrs. Wells’ for making
her clothes at home and “considering her savings too carefully” in purchasing a hat.
Mrs. Bruère saw the result of thrift as turning “loose an ugly home and ugly clothes
on an unprotected community.” 84 The Bruères and others argued for more spending
on goods and refinement, especially for the education and acculturation of children.
Average middle-class families put aside three hundred dollars for savings, which the
Bruères characterized as the families’ “most serious financial mistake” causing them
to “cut off $300 a year from their pleasure and usefulness.”85
This concern with underconsumption by the working and middle classes was
particularly high during the Great Depression of the 1930s. Some liberals including
a contingent of Roosevelt advisers adhered to an underconsumptionist explanation
for the Depression.86 Industrialists had not passed the productivity gains of the
1920s to workers in wages, or to consumers with lower prices. Journalist Stuart
Chase wrote, “It is not so much overproduction as underconsumption which is the
appalling fact . . . Millions of tons of additional material could readily be marketed if
purchasing power were available. Alas, purchasing power is not available.”87 In a
1933 speech Roosevelt said:
The day of the great promoter or the financial Titan, to whom we granted
everything if only he would build, or develop, is over. Our task now is
not discovery, or exploitation of natural resources, or necessarily
producing more goods. It is the soberer, less dramatic business of
administering resources and plants already in hand, of seeking to
reestablish foreign markets for our surplus production, of meeting the
problem of underconsumption, of adjusting production to consumption, of
distributing wealth and products more equitably.88
Estate taxation could play a role in this readjustment. Some comparable ideas
were present in Keynesian analysis, although Keynesianism had “only an oblique”
82
SIMON N. PATTEN, THE NEW BASIS
Press 1968) (1907).
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CIVILIZATION 215 (Daniel M. Fox ed., Belknap

83

HOROWITZ, supra note 76, at 88.

84

Martha B. Bruère, What Is Home For?, OUTLOOK, Dec. 16, 1911, at 911-12, in
HOROWITZ, supra note 76, at 96-97 n.9. See also id. at 89.
85

HOROWITZ, supra note 76, at 97.

86

ALAN BRINKLEY, THE END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR
65-85 (1995). DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN
DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929-1945, 122-23 (1999).
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BRINKLEY, supra note 86, at 70 (citations omitted).
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Rosenman ed., 1938).
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influence on New Deal policy.89 By taxing the estates of the wealthy and
redistributing that money to the less well-off, the hope was that worker spending
would renew the economy. Randolph Paul, an important figure in Roosevelt’s
Treasury Department, gave his account of Keynes’ views on estate taxation and
consumption:
This reasoning led to the conclusion that the abstinence, or lack of
spending, of the rich might impede instead of help the growth of wealth.
On this premise one of the principal justifications of high-income and
great wealth fell by the wayside. Keynes came finally to the conclusion
that inequality of inheritances stood on a lower basis of justification than
inequality of income; in his opinion death duties calculated to promote a
greater propensity to consume might very well promote the growth of
capital because of the redistribution of wealth they effected.90
While estate tax opponents see virtue in saving and in its opposite, spending, it is
important to understand the conflicting strains in the morality of spending. The
Veblenesque critique is countered by cautions about oversaving. Who is spending,
who is saving?
The economic version of the moral hazard of the estate tax—its supposed
suppression of virtuous savings—cannot be the full story. A focus only on the
decedent overlooks other effects. Similar points have been made by Tom Baker with
respect to insurance (very broadly conceived). Insurance arrangements benefit not
only the parties to the contract. For example, “workers’ compensation supports
family members and communities who depend on workers’ wages; workers’
compensation also benefits coworkers whose health or safety would be compromised
if injured workers stayed on the job. Perhaps more importantly, workers’
compensation sustains the myth that employers take care of their workers, the myth
that bodies are not manufacturing inputs, and the myth that people are more
important than profit.”91 Surely, one can argue that the presence of the estate tax
provides revenue for governmental programs. Its presence also suggests that there
are limits to the extent to which individuals can be given an unequal position in
society. As Baker puts it, “Unless and until economic theory can bring these public
goods into the moral hazard equation, the economics of moral hazard will
systematically understate the benefits of social responsibility, overstate the costs,
and, in the process, provide unwarranted support for the current legal and political
flight from responsibility.”92
III. CONCLUSION
The expansion of moral hazard to include positive externalities suggests that a
broader perspective on estate taxation is appropriate. Consideration of the estate tax
89

RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 226 (1954).

90

Id. at 230. I take no position on the underlying economic debates here. What I do wish
to do is to highlight the very contingent perceptions of the morality of consumption and the
role that tax policy can play in implementing views about consumption.
91

Baker, supra note 10, at 288.

92

Id.
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should include decedent-centered concerns, such as immortality and incentives to
save or spend. However, the analysis cannot end at this point.
Some estate tax opponents would argue that the tax impedes their ability to
provide for their families after death and to aid their families in maintaining their
present standard of living. One could see the marital deduction as consistent with
such ideas with respect to a surviving spouse.93 Particularly as the focus moves to
lower generation heirs, perceptions may alter. Stanley Herz’s New York Times essay
on his frugal in-laws94 provoked the following response:
He and his wife just inherited some $675,000 tax-free plus nearly twothirds of some amount above that figure that he, presumably, never
expected because his in-laws were never wealthy people. And he is
complaining about paying taxes on a portion of it? And if he received this
largesse tax-free it would somehow reinforce the ‘family values’ of hard
work and savings? Why? Because he wouldn’t have to work anymore?95
If the government could have bad character and provide perverse incentives in a
decedent-centered view, so those inheriting wealth can be portrayed as corrupted by
their windfalls, becoming moral hazards themselves.
Some reformers have taken this insight seriously, proposing a shift from donorbased taxation to regimes that impose taxation on the recipients of wealth.96
Property in the hands of donees or beneficiaries seems less a matter of desert,
perhaps less constitutive of personality.97 Proposals for an accessions tax or for
recipient-based income taxation have appeared from time to time.98
The focus can move beyond family and “the natural objects of one’s bounty” to
society at large. As Jane Addams wrote in 1902, “To attain individual morality in
an age demanding social morality, to pride one’s self on the results of personal effort
when the time demands social adjustment is utterly to fail to apprehend the
situation.”99 Andrew Carnegie portrayed “the man of Wealth” as separate from the
state and from society, but charged with a trust relationship with the less fortunate.100
93

I.R.C. § 2056 (1994).
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See supra note 67.
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Charles W. Gossett, Letter to the Editor, NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 25, 2000, at A26.
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See, e.g., Edward C. Halbach, Jr., An Accessions Tax, 23 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 211
(1988); William D. Andrews, The Accessions Tax Proposal, 22 TAX L. REV. 589 (1967);
Eugene Steuerle, Estate or Accessions Tax - An Equity Question, 11 TAX NOTES 459 (1980);
INSTITUTE FOR FISCAL STUDIES, THE STRUCTURE AND REFORM OF DIRECT TAXATION: REPORT
OF A COMMITTEE CHAIRED BY PROF. J.E. MEADE (1978); Joseph Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift
Tax Reform: Including Gifts and Bequests in Income, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1177 (1978).
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See supra note 57.
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See supra note 96. For a recent op-ed advocating the accessions tax, see Michael S.
McPherson & Morton Owen Shapiro, A Sensible Tax on Fortunes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2001,
at A27.
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One can see in the recent defense of the estate tax by George Soros, William H.
Gates, David Rockefeller, and Warren Buffett a similar sense of obligation to others
and support for incentives for charitable contribution.101
Finally, there is at least one other frame by which one can attempt to evaluate the
moral hazard of the estate tax. Progressive economist E.R.A. Seligman’s Essays in
Taxation, first published in 1895, provided a counterpoint to perspectives dividing
the individual and the state. In his critique of the single tax and of the benefit theory
of taxation, Seligman wrote:
It is now generally agreed that we pay taxes not because the state protects
us, or because we get any benefits from the state, but simply because the
state is a part of us. The duty of supporting and protecting it is born with
us. In civilized society the state is as necessary to the individual as the air
he breathes; unless he reverts to stateless savagery and anarchy he cannot
live beyond its confines. His every action is conditioned by the fact of its
existence. He does not choose the state, but is born into it; it is
interwoven with the very fibres of his being; nay, in the last resort, he
gives to it his very life.102
According to Seligman’s argument, the focus on the individual, on family, on
society at large missed a fundamental point. “We pay taxes not because we get
benefits from the state, but because it is as much our duty to support the state as to
support ourselves or our family; because, in short, the state is an integral part of
us.”103
The lens of moral hazard provides a way in which to more critically analyze
various moral arguments about the estate tax. In the end, the estate tax provides a
particularly vivid example of the ways in which taxation touches on questions of
identity, individuality and one’s relationship to family, to society and to the state.
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